:mastodon: decio<p><strong>SVG phishing campaign delivers infostealer</strong></p><p>A few days ago, the excellent <strong>Risky Biz</strong> newsletter highlighted the growing abuse of the <strong>SVG format</strong> in malicious campaigns.<br><br>⬇️ <br><a href="https://risky.biz/risky-bulletin-svg-use-for-phishing-explodes-in-2025/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">risky.biz/risky-bulletin-svg-u</span><span class="invisible">se-for-phishing-explodes-in-2025/</span></a></p><p>We’ve seen several of them since the beginning of the year — with a noticeable spike last week.</p><p>The latest one is in <strong>German</strong> and aims to deploy an <strong>infostealer</strong>, through a well-crafted invoice-themed lure.</p> <p><strong>✉️ The lure: a professional-looking invoice</strong></p><p>The victim receives an email (often from a legitimate company address that has been hacked) with a subject line like:</p><blockquote><p><strong>Rechnung Nr. 0XXXXXX</strong></p></blockquote><p>The body thanks the recipient for a recent order and invites them to open the attached invoice. That attachment is a <strong>.svg file</strong> (e.g. <code>R_0494467.svg</code>, ) — an unusual format for invoices, but not enough to raise suspicion for many users.</p><p>[Live analysis example in Joe]<br>⬇️<br><a href="https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1705755/0/html#deviceScreen" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">joesandbox.com/analysis/170575</span><span class="invisible">5/0/html#deviceScreen</span></a></p> <p><strong>🖼️ The decoy: a fake Adobe Acrobat screen</strong></p><p>When opened, the SVG displays a <strong>fake Adobe Acrobat Reader interface</strong> with the message:</p><blockquote><p><em>„Bitte warten Sie, Ihr Dokument wird hochgeladen…”</em><br><br>("Please wait, your document is being uploaded...")</p></blockquote><p>While the victim sees this reassuring screen, a <strong>heavily obfuscated JavaScript payload</strong> executes silently in the background.</p> <p><strong>🧪 Technical steps of the attack</strong></p><ol><li>The SVG-embedded JavaScript <strong>decrypts and builds logic in memory</strong>.</li><li><p>It dynamically redirects to an <strong>intermediate script</strong> hosted at:<br>hxxps://pdf-zone-update[.]com/script.php?id=...<br>⬇️ <br><a href="https://any.run/report/1528482540479dfdd79ba9cbf07d24c52c2ec39adb54a83a2287f008a21275a2/bf2e0e6f-871c-40b8-b7c5-abb4fd3d6bf0" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">any.run/report/1528482540479df</span><span class="invisible">dd79ba9cbf07d24c52c2ec39adb54a83a2287f008a21275a2/bf2e0e6f-871c-40b8-b7c5-abb4fd3d6bf0</span></a></p></li><li><p>This script performs:</p></li><li><p>A <strong>user-agent check</strong> to avoid sandboxes/VMs,</p></li><li><p>Then sets the <code>href</code> of a hidden link to:</p><pre><code>hxxps://w-update-server3092[.]com/file.php?id=...<br></code></pre><p>[obfuscated javascript]<br>⬇️ <br><a href="https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/25f9f7ab644ffcde8bf5b6e8835fce7fab981d4189418bb96c5f9e06d52e0ede/content" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://www.</span><span class="ellipsis">virustotal.com/gui/file/25f9f7</span><span class="invisible">ab644ffcde8bf5b6e8835fce7fab981d4189418bb96c5f9e06d52e0ede/content</span></a></p></li><li><p>The browser automatically follows this link and retrieves a <strong>PowerShell loader</strong>.</p></li><li><p>The PowerShell:</p></li><li><p>Executes a <strong>.NET infostealer in-memory</strong>,</p></li><li><p>Takes a <strong>screenshot</strong> and exfiltrates it via:</p><pre><code>hxxps://0x0[.]st<br></code></pre></li><li><p>Extracts <strong>Outlook and Thunderbird credentials</strong> (via DPAPI and local files),</p></li><li><p>Contacts a <strong>C2 server</strong>:</p><pre><code>hxxp://176.65.138[.]152/server.php<br></code></pre></li><li><p>Receives a <strong>registry-based persistence command</strong>:</p><pre><code>REG ADD "HKCU\...\Run" /V "System Update2" /D "wscript.exe \"%SCRIPT_NAME%\""<br></code></pre> </li><li><p><strong>Layered execution</strong> with obfuscation and intermediary JS filtering.</p></li><li><p><strong>PowerShell payload is native</strong> (no dependencies).</p></li><li><p><strong>Plaintext C2 communication</strong>.</p></li><li><p>Registry key name (<code>System Update2</code>) is designed to blend in.</p></li></ol> <p><strong>📁 Key IOCs</strong></p><ul><li>Initial file: <code>R_0494467.svg</code> (~15KB)</li><li>Intermediate JS URL: <code>pdf-zone-update[.]com/script.php</code></li><li>PowerShell loader: <code>w-update-server3092[.]com</code></li><li>C2: <code>176.65.138[.]152</code></li><li>Screenshot exfiltration: <code>0x0[.]st</code></li><li>Persistence key:HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run→ "System Update2" → wscript.exe "%SCRIPT_NAME%"</li></ul><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/CyberVeille" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>CyberVeille</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/SVG" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>SVG</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/infostealer" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>infostealer</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/infosec" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>infosec</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/phishing" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>phishing</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/infosec" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>infosec</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/IoC" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>IoC</span></a></p>