Erik van Straten<p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://hachyderm.io/@apicultor" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">@<span>apicultor</span></a></span> boasted in <a href="https://hachyderm.io/@apicultor/114518285382834735" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" translate="no" target="_blank"><span class="invisible">https://</span><span class="ellipsis">hachyderm.io/@apicultor/114518</span><span class="invisible">285382834735</span></a>:</p><p>"As someone with industry credentials in privacy regulation and compliance, I am telling you that you're talking out of your ass on these points."</p><p>And in the toot above you wrote:</p><p>"The key signs a nonce. If nonces are predictable then you have bigger problems. If they are not, there can be no replay."</p><p>Apicultor <-> Mallory <-> Erik</p><p>Suppose you (Apicultor) sends me a nonce which Mallory forwards to me. I then sign that nonce and return it, and Mallory forwards the signed nonce to you.</p><p>You will not be able to destinguish Mallory from me.</p><p>That situation changes if I include Mallory's domain name, and preferably a timestamp plus the reason for authentication (which was told to me by Mallory - and may be a lie).</p><p>However, misissued certificates will still wreak havoc.</p><p>Fix: instead of the domain name, I could include (a cryptograhic hash of) the certificate that Mallory sent to my browser. Unfortunately that will fail in the case of TLS inspection, such as conducted by some EDR solutions.</p><p>Anyway, with all your "industry credentials in privacy regulation and compliance", you mentioned none of the above in:</p><p>"The key signs a nonce. If nonces are predictable then you have bigger problems. If they are not, there can be no replay."</p><p>Last but not least, even with the solutions I proposed, the reliability depends on whether the RP (here "Apicultor") correctly validates that all signed data is as expected (I'm not holding my breath here).</p><p>Reliable authentication mandates that the verifying party is trustworthy. The absolute minimum a user needs to know is who the verifying party is and how reliable that information is.</p><p>Muting you now (don't bother to respond), blocking you in a couple of hours.</p><p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://noc.social/@hlindqvist" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">@<span>hlindqvist</span></a></span> </p><p><a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Phishing" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Phishing</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/NoSolutions" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>NoSolutions</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/Nonce" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>Nonce</span></a> <a href="https://infosec.exchange/tags/SignedNonce" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank">#<span>SignedNonce</span></a></p>