Data Retention and Democratic Resilience
A critical policy analysis of security, legality and fundamental rights within the European Union.
https://scribe.disroot.org/post/2914542#EU #Surveillance #DigitalRights #Privacy #AI #DataRetentionscribe.disroot.orgscribe.disroot.orgDoes Data Retention Prevent Crime? - D•ScribeDoes Data Retention Prevent Crime? A Critical Analysis in Light of Union Law,
Fundamental Rights, and Alternative Policy Models Executive Summary This study
provides a critical analysis of the effectiveness of general and indiscriminate
data retention practices practices within the European Union (EU) regarding
crime prevention. Particularly in the context of criminal proceedings, it
becomes evident that data retention practices does not deliver the expected
security gains, while simultaneously posing significant threats to EU
fundamental rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and the
protection of private life. Key Findings: Weak Legal Foundation: The practice of
comprehensive data retention practices contradicts primary EU law, as confirmed
by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
(Digital Rights Ireland, Tele2 Sverige). Limited Effectiveness: Independent
research indicates that it does not improve the crime clearance rate.
Interference with Fundamental Rights: Journalism, activism, and political
opposition are affected by chilling effects. Increasing Economic Burden: Smaller
providers bear excessive costs; cybersecurity risks are on the rise.
Technological Inadequacy: In the age of IoT, 5G, and artificial intelligence
(AI), data volumes are exploding, making these storage models increasingly
intrusive and uncontrollable. Key Recommendations to the Commission: General
forms of data retention practices should be strictly avoided. Member States
should promote targeted models with time limits and independent judicial
authorization. The right to encryption and anonymity should be respected, and
users’ digital privacy strengthened. Supportive infrastructures and policies to
alleviate the burden on small and medium-sized enterprises should be developed,
with particular consideration for economic impacts. 1. Introduction With ongoing
digitalization, methods of combating crime have also evolved. One such method is
data retention practices, which is widespread, under the pretext of
counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, these general and indiscriminate practices pose
significant risks to individual freedoms and often fail to achieve the intended
security objectives. This study, as part of the European Commission’s Impact
Assessment process, thoroughly examines the dimensions of necessity,
proportionality, impact on EU fundamental rights, utility for criminal justice,
and economic costs of current data retention practices policies. Furthermore,
their future viability in the age of new technologies is analyzed. 2.
Methodology The study is based on a qualitative content analysis. Key sources
include: Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU)): the Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2
Sverige decisions. European Court of Human Rights (European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR)): the Big Brother Watch v. United Kingdom decision. Independent
Reports: such as those from ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and
the European Parliament. National Case Studies: such as the Turkish ByLock case.
Additionally, statistical data and economic cost analyses were included to
evaluate both the effectiveness and the social and technical consequences of
data retention practices. 3. Literature Review Research on data retention
practices can be broadly categorized into three areas: 3.1 Legal Approaches
Binns (2018) meticulously analyzes the incompatibility of these practices with
the right to privacy. De Hert & Poullet (2013) address the legitimacy of such
measures in light of EU fundamental rights. 3.2 Effectiveness Assessment
Hoofnagle et al. (2012) demonstrate that data retention practices measures
introduced under the Patriot Act in the USA showed no measurable effect. ENISA
(2020) highlights the technical and financial burdens faced by small providers.
3.3 Political and Societal Impacts Lyon (2018) links these policy forms to the
emergence of a “surveillance society.” Zuboff (2019) exposes how platforms
commercially exploit personal data—a phenomenon she describes as “surveillance
capitalism.” 4. Data Retention and EU Law: Necessity and Proportionality 4.1
Necessity Test In the view of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),
general data retention practices practices do not pass the necessity test. They
have so far failed to provide clear evidence of their suitability against
terrorism or serious crimes. 4.2 Proportionality Test The principles of
proportionality are violated because: All citizens are indiscriminately
affected. No suspicion is required. The retention period is excessive (up to two
years). No prior authorization by independent courts is mandated. 5. Utility for
Criminal Justice 5.1 Presumption of Innocence This policy encourages “fishing
expeditions,” which in turn undermines the presumption of innocence. 5.2 Example
Turkey – ByLock Case Millions of individuals were suspected without concrete
evidence based solely on the use of an app (ByLock); mere presence in metadata
was sufficient. 6. Economic and Technical Costs 6.1 Impact on Service Providers
ENISA (2020) notes that small providers, in particular, face disproportionate
financial pressure. 6.2 Cybersecurity Risks The inability to securely store
sensitive data leads to: Massive data breaches. Increased risks to public
safety. Loss of trust in digital systems. 7. Future Outlook: IoT, 5G, and
Artificial Intelligence The explosive increase in data volumes due to IoT, 5G,
and artificial intelligence (AI) renders traditional storage models unsuitable.
artificial intelligence (AI) today goes beyond mere analysis—it can derive new
correlations that further endanger EU fundamental rights. 7.1 New Risks Posed by
artificial intelligence (AI) and Mass Data Analysis Automated Profiling and
Discrimination: artificial intelligence (AI) models learn from historical data.
If these data contain systematic biases (e.g., association with a criminal
offense solely based on using an app like ByLock, which can lead to collective
stigmatization), such biases can be automatically reproduced and discriminatory
practices intensified, unjustly targeting groups or individuals. False Positives
and Weakening of the Presumption of Innocence: Statistically relevant
correlations can be misleading or oversimplified. For example, a model might
falsely identify a user group as statistically linked to “suspicious” activity
based on the use of a particular app, even if there is no concrete individual
evidence. This undermines the presumption of innocence. Opacity and Lack of
Transparency: Often, artificial intelligence (AI) systems operate as black
boxes, whose decision-making processes are not explicit or easily traceable.
This makes it difficult for affected individuals to ascertain the reasons for
surveillance measures or other decisions concerning them, or to effectively
defend themselves against them, thereby impairing the right to an effective
remedy. 7.2 Lack of Adaptation of Current Policy to New Technologies Existing
data retention practices rules are not equipped to handle the rapidly increasing
data streams from IoT, the speed of 5G, or the predictive capabilities of
artificial intelligence (AI). This leads to general storage models becoming
unmanageable and misuse risks increasing. Without independent judicial control,
massive risks of abuse threaten to undermine social justice and EU fundamental
rights. Conclusion to Chapter 7 In developing future artificial intelligence
(AI)-supported methods for combating crime, the principles of data collection
and analysis must be subjected not only to technical but also to strict ethical
and legal limits. Otherwise, general data retention practices measures combined
with artificial intelligence (AI) could lead to a structure that contradicts the
values of democratic societies, violates human dignity, and opens the door to
arbitrary interventions. 8. Conclusions and Recommendations General data
retention practices possesses neither a stable legal basis nor demonstrable
effectiveness. It directly attacks the most EU fundamental rights. Specific
Recommendations to the Commission: The Commission should determine that these
practices are incompatible with primary Union law, as confirmed by Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) jurisprudence. Member States should receive
clear guidelines to promote targeted, proportionate models limited to serious
crimes, under independent judicial control. Frameworks for the protection of
encryption, anonymity, and digital privacy must be strengthened. Small and
medium-sized service providers burdened by the requirements should be relieved
through technical and financial support. Bibliography Binns, R. (2018).
Algorithmic Accountability and Transparency in the EU GDPR. Philosophy &
Technology, 31(2), 211–233. De Hert, P., & Poullet, Y. (2013). The Data
Retention Directive: The Ghost that Should Not Walk. Computer Law & Security
Review, 29(6), 673–683. Hoofnagle, C. J. et al. (2012). How Different is Privacy
Law in Europe vs. the US? Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 28(2), 411–454. Lyon,
D. (2018). The Culture of Surveillance: Watching as a Way of Life. Polity Press.
Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. PublicAffairs. European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (2021). Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United
Kingdom, Application no. 58170/13. Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
(2014). Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, Marine and
Natural Resources and Others, Case C-293/12. Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) (2016). Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary
of State for the Home Department v. Tom Watson and Others, Joined Cases C-203/15
and C-698/15. ENISA (2020). Data Retention Practices in Europe. European Union
Agency for Cybersecurity. European Parliament (2019). Privacy and Data
Protection in Law Enforcement.