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khaleesi (Elina Eickstädt)

Der „neue“ Text enthält minimale Änderungen.
TL;DR
Das wording wurde weiter abgeändert, so dass es so scheint als wäre Verschlüsselung angemessen geschützt. Wenn man genau hinschaut sieht man aber das es lediglich um den Schutz verschlüsselte Kommunikation in Transit handelt, scannen vor der Verschlüsselung ist nicht geschützt. Kurz, Client Side Scanning.
1/x
chaos.social/@andre_meister/11

chaos.socialAndre Meister (@andre_meister@chaos.social)Attached: 1 image Hier ist das Chatkontrolle-Gesetz der Ratspräsidentschaft in voller Länge: https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2024/06/2024-06-14_Council_Presidency_CSAR_Partial-mandate_11277.pdf Wir veröffentlichen die 218 Seiten, die die EU-Staaten morgen als Verhandlungsposition beschließen wollen, ohne Wasserzeichen.
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khaleesi (Elina Eickstädt)


Alles andere bleibt wie zuvor. Ein paar Pseudo safeguards im Hinblick auf Cybersecurity Risikoassessments und Zertifizierungen von Scanning Technologien.
Ändert aber alles nichts daran das Verschlüsselung gebrochen wird und die Risiken gleichbleibend hoch sind. 2/X

khaleesi (Elina Eickstädt)


Wer sich den Text komplett anschauen möchte, Achtung im Gegensatz zur best practice ist alles fett was Unterschiede zum Text der Kommission darstellt.
Legt also am besten den vorherigen Text daneben. 3/X

Jun 19, 2024, 08:38 AM·Public·Ivory for iOS
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khaleesi (Elina Eickstädt)


Wer noch einmal nachlesen möchte was das Problem mit Client Side Scanning ist bitte hier entlang:

arxiv.org/abs/2110.07450

arXiv.orgBugs in our Pockets: The Risks of Client-Side ScanningOur increasing reliance on digital technology for personal, economic, and government affairs has made it essential to secure the communications and devices of private citizens, businesses, and governments. This has led to pervasive use of cryptography across society. Despite its evident advantages, law enforcement and national security agencies have argued that the spread of cryptography has hindered access to evidence and intelligence. Some in industry and government now advocate a new technology to access targeted data: client-side scanning (CSS). Instead of weakening encryption or providing law enforcement with backdoor keys to decrypt communications, CSS would enable on-device analysis of data in the clear. If targeted information were detected, its existence and, potentially, its source, would be revealed to the agencies; otherwise, little or no information would leave the client device. Its proponents claim that CSS is a solution to the encryption versus public safety debate: it offers privacy -- in the sense of unimpeded end-to-end encryption -- and the ability to successfully investigate serious crime. In this report, we argue that CSS neither guarantees efficacious crime prevention nor prevents surveillance. Indeed, the effect is the opposite. CSS by its nature creates serious security and privacy risks for all society while the assistance it can provide for law enforcement is at best problematic. There are multiple ways in which client-side scanning can fail, can be evaded, and can be abused.
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